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Following Romero (2003), this paper develops a unified analysis of two types of N(oun) P(hrase)s:
concealed question NPs with know and NP subjects of specificational sentences with be. It is
argued that both epistemic know and specificational be are intensional verbs requiring an inten-
sional semantic argument. It is further argued that this semantic argument is, in both cases, propo-
sitional in nature. Crosslinguistic data on pronominalization, coordination and matching effects
in free relatives are provided in support of these conclusions.
Key words: concealed question, specificational copular sentence, intensionality, connectivity,
pronominalization, gender, coordination, matching effects.
1. Introduction
This paper is concerned with two kinds of Noun Phrases (NPs): concealed ques-
tion NPs with know-type verbs and specificational subject NPs with be. 
The underlined NPs in (1) are called ‘concealed question NPs’ (CQs, hence-
forth) because sentences that embed them typically convey the same truth-condi-
tional meaning as the corresponding versions with an embedded interrogative, as
illustrated in (2) (Heim 1979):
(1) a. John knows Bill’s telephone number.
b. They announced the winner of the contest.
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b. They announced who won the contest.
Specificational Subjects (SSs, henceforth) are the pre-verbal NPs of (non-invert-
ed) specificational copular sentences. Copular sentences can be divided into at least
two groups: predicational sentences and specificational sentences (Higgins 1973).
Intuitively, in predicational sentences the post-verbal XP’s denotation is predicat-
ed of the subject’s denotation, as in (3), whereas in specificational sentences «the
Subject [MR: underlined] in some way delimits a domain and the specificational
predicate determines a member of that domain» (Higgins 1973:132), as in (4). 
(3) The number of planets is large. PREDICATIONAL
(4) The number of planets is nine. SPECIFICATIONAL
Furthermore, predicational and specificational copular sentences differ gram-
matically with respect to so-called connectivity effects (Akmajian 1970, Higgins
1973, Jacobson 1994, Sharvit 1999). Here we will only illustrate two types of con-
nectivity effects: Binding Theory and variable binding. Binding Theory dictates
that a name cannot be c-commanded by a co-indexed expression (principle C),
and that a reflexive must be locally c-commanded by a co-indexed expression (prin-
ciple A) (Chomsky 1986:166ff.), as shown in (5). This analysis straighforwardly
applies to the predicational sentences in (6), in which the co-indexed NP he1 does
not c-command outside the Relative Clause. But some extra assumptions are need-
ed to account for the specificational sentences in (7), in which principle C is vio-
lated and principle A is satisfied despite the apparent lack of c-command from the
embedded subject he1 to John1 / himself1:
(5) a. He1 likes John*1/ 2.
b. (Paul2 thinks) he1 likes himself1/ *2.
(6) a. The person that he1 likes best is nice to John1.
b. * The person that he1 likes best is nice to himself1.
(7) a. * The person that he1 likes best is John1.
b. The person that he1 likes best is himself1.
In similar fashion, a binder must c-command its bindee at Logical Form, as
shown in (8) (see e.g. Heim-Kratzer 1998). This condition, together with the assump-
tion that a quantifier cannot Q(uantifier) R(aise) out of a complex NP island, is
able to account for the fact that variable binding does not obtain in the predica-
tional sentence (9a), as shown in its L(ogical) F(orm) representation (9b). In con-
trast, variable binding is possible in the specificational sentence (10a) despite the
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tions are needed to explain specificational structures.
(8) a. No boy1’s pet acknowledged him1.
b. LF: [IP No boy1 [IP t1’s pet aknowledged him1] ] 
(9) a. * The woman no boy1 saw was interested in him1.
b. LF:  [NP-Island The woman [CP (that)2 no boy1 saw t2] ] was interested in him1. 
(10) a. The woman no boy1 saw was his1 mother.
b. LF:  [NP-Island The woman [CP (that)2 no boy1 saw t2] ] was his1 mother. 
Romero (2003) argues for a unified analysis of CQs and SSs that sets them
apart from regular NPs in extensional contexts. In particular, Romero shows that,
in the same way that verbs like know taking CQs are intensional with respect their
CQ argument, so is specificational be intensional with respect to its SS. She spells
out one possible implementation of her unified intensional analysis –implementa-
tion (i)–, but she also mentions a second implementation –implementation (ii)– as
a possible alternative. In implementation (i), know and specificational be combine
directly with the semantic contribution of the NP. In implementation (ii), the NP
combines with an ANS(wer) operator –comparable to those proposed for interroga-
tive clauses in Heim (1994) and Beck-Rullmann (1999)–, yielding a proposition-
al concept, and this propositional concept is the argument of know and be. Romero
(2003) leaves the choice of one implementation over the other for future research.
The goal of this paper is two-fold. First, the paper provides further support for
a unified analysis of CQs and SSs. Second, it presents evidence in favor of imple-
mentation (ii), where the arguments of know and be are the complexes ANS(CQ)
and ANS(SS), which have a propositional nature. To this end, three grammatical
characteristics will be discussed. The first piece of data concerns pronominal refe-
rence to CQs and SSs in languages with an (at least partially) referentially based gen-
der system, like English and Finnish. Coordination of verbs taking CQs/SSs with
verbs that do not take CQs/SSs gives rise to the second empirical pattern, tested
in non-pro-drop languages like English, German, Finnish and Russian. Finally, the
so-called matching effects in Catalan and Spanish free relatives (from Hirschbühler-
Rivero (1983a,b)) will be examined. These three sets of data provide further argu-
ments for a unified analysis of CQs and SSs and will be shown to support imple-
mentation (ii) over implementation (i).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents Romero’s (2003) unified
analysis of CQs with know and SSs with be as well as its two possible implemen-
tations, providing new crosslinguistic examples and developing the analysis fur-
ther in the points relevant to the present discussion. Section 3 presents the three
aforementioned sets of data. The data on pronominal reference are presented in
subsection 3.1; the coordination data are introduced in subsection 3.2; and sub-
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on the choice of implementation (ii). Section 4 concludes.
2. A Unified Intensional Analysis of CQs and SSs
2.1. Heim’s (1979) ambiguity for CQs
Following Karttunen (1977), an interrogative clause expresses a function from worlds
to the set of true answers to that interrogative in that world. This is illustrated in
(11). This function then combines with the denotation of (strongly exhaustive) know
in Heim (1994), given in (12), to yield the truth conditions of sentence (13), spelled
out in (14). Roughly, (14) states that John knows in w who spoke if and only if, for
all his belief worlds w’, the set of true answers to this question in the belief world w’
is exactly the same as the set of true answers in the actual world w. 
(11) [[who spoke]]= λw. {p: p(w) & ∃x [p=λw".spoke(x,w")]}
(Karttunen 1977)
(12) [[knowqu]] = λq<s,<<s,t>,t>>λxeλw. ∀w′∈Doxx(w) [ q(w′) = q(w) ](Heim 1994:(9))
(13) John knows who spoke.
(14) [[John knows who spoke]] = λw. ∀w′∈Doxj(w) 
[ {p: p(w′) & ∃x [p=λw′′.spoke(x,w′′)]} = {p: p(w) & ∃x [p=λw′′.spoke(x,w′′)]} ]
This analysis can easily be extended to simple concealed question NPs. The
NP the capital of Italy, when functioning as a CQ, contributes an individual con-
cept, i.e. a function from worlds to (possibly plural sums of) individuals. This indi-
vidual concept can be spelled out as in (15a) or as in (15b).1 The concealed ques-
tion counterpart of interrogative know is given in (16). When these combine in
sentence (17), we obtain the truth-conditions in (18). In a way parallel to (14), the
formula (18) states that John knows in w the capital of Italy if and only if, for all of
John’s doxastic alternatives w′, the value of this individual concept in w′ is exact-
ly what is it is in the actual world w.
1. In (15a), capital-of-Italy is a 2-place predicate over individual - world pairs. In (15b), capital-of-
Italy is a 2-place predicate over individual concept - world pairs, which applies truly to a pair
<x<s,e>,w> iff it is true in w that, for all the w′′∈Dom(x), x(w′′) has the property of being the capi-
tal of Italy in w′′. We will use the second notation to make it more parallel to the formal translation
of know in (16), which applies to an individual concept and a world (and to the denotation of the
subject). (Later, we will see that know can also take an individual concept concept, and we will
correspondingly allow for this possibility in the head noun as well.) The choice of notation for the
head noun has no impact on the arguments presented in the present paper regarding the inten-
sionality of know.
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a. λw. ιx
e
[capital-of-Italy(x,w)] or
b. íx <s,e> [capital-of-Italy(x,w)]
(16) [[knowCQ]]     = λy<s,e>λxeλw. ∀w′∈Doxx(w) [ y(w′) = y(w) ]
(17) John knows the capital of Italy.
(18) [[John knows the capital of Italy]] = 
λw.∀w′∈Doxj(w) [ íx <s,e>[capital-of-Italy(x,w)](w′) = 
íx <s,e>[capital-of-Italy(x,w)](w)]
With this background, Heim (1979) presents an interesting ambiguity for nested
CQs. A sentence like (19) has two readings, which we will call reading A and
reading B. Reading A, described in (20), can be unambiguously paraphrased as
‘John knows the same price that Fred knows’. 
(19) John knows the price that Fred knows. (Heim 1979)
(20) Reading A: ‘John knows the same price that Fred knows.’
There are several relevant questions about prices: 
«How much does the milk cost?»
«How much does the oil cost?»
«How much does the ham cost?»
Fred knows the answer to exactly one of these questions, e.g., to the first one.
John knows the answer to this question too.
The second reading of (19), reading B, is described in (21) and can be unam-
biguously paraphrased as ‘John knows what price Fred knows’.
(21) Reading B: ‘John knows what price Fred knows.’
There are several relevant questions about prices:
«How much does the milk cost?»
«How much does the oil cost?»
«How much does the ham cost?»
Fred knows the answer to one of these questions, e.g., to «How much does 
the milk cost?».
Then, there is the «meta-question» asking which of these questions is the one 
whose answer Fred knows.
John knows the answer to the meta-question. I.e., John knows that the ques-
tion about prices whose answer Fred knows is «How much does the milk cost?».
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as well, like Catalan and German. Both (22) and (23) are ambiguous between read-
ing A and reading B.
(22) En Joan sap el preu que sap en Pere. (Catalan)
The Joan knows the price that knows the Pere
‘Joan knows the price that Pere knows.’
(23) Jonas erinnert sich an den Preis, den Peter erraten hat.
(German)
Jonas remembers REFL PREP the price that Peter guessed has
‘Jonas remembers the price that Klaus guessed.’
2.2. Romero’s (2003) analysis of the ambiguity of CQs. Implementations (i) and (ii)
Romero (2003) shows that using exclusively the extension of the NP the price that
Fred knows cannot capture the desired ambiguity. She then compares know with
intensional verbs like look for, which take an intensional object as their argument
(e.g., Zimmermann 1992, Moltmann 1997). This intensional object is often pro-
vided by the intension of its complement NP, as exemplified in (24). But this inten-
sional object can also arise from the extension of a higher type NP. This second
possibility is illustrated in (25), which has a de dicto reading on the extension of the
NP that makes the sentence true in scenario (26):
(24) John is looking for the unicorn with the longest horn.
‘In all of John’s bouletic alternatives w′ in w: John finds in w′ the individual
that is the unicorn with the longest horn in w′ (whichever that may be).’
➩ look for takes as its argument the INTENSION of the NP.
(25) John is looking for the unicorn Fred is looking for (: the one with the longest 
horn.)
‘Each x out of John and Fred is such that, in all of x’s bouletic alternatives w′
in w: x finds in w′ the individual that is the unicorn with the longest horn in
w′ (whichever that may be).’
➩ look for takes as its argument the EXTENSION of the NP, which is an inten-
sional object.
(26) Scenario:
John does not have any beliefs as to which unicorn has the longest horn. He
wants to catch the unicorn with the longest horn, whichever that may be.
Exactly the same holds for Fred.
It is then argued that the reading A / reading B ambiguity is nothing more than
the possibility of drawing an intensional object from the extension or from the
intension of the NP. Reading A results when this intensional object corresponds to
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from the intension of the NP. This is summarized in (27):
(27) John knows the price that Fred knows.
a. Reading A: [[know]] + EXTENSION of [NP the price that Fred knows].
b. Reading B: [[know]] + INTENSION of [NP the price that Fred knows].
This analysis of the reading A / reading B ambiguity can be implemented in
two ways. Under the first implementation, given in Romero (2003), the intensional
object x corresponding to the extension or intension of the NP is the direct seman-
tic argument of the verb know. This is syntactically represented in (28). Under the
second implementation, the intensional object is the argument of an answer opera-
tor ANS, and the value of ANS applied to x, ANS(x), is the semantic argument of
know. The corresponding syntactic representation is sketched in (29). We will con-
sider each implementation in turn.
(28) Implementation (i):
(29) Implementation (ii):
The tree in (30) shows the semantic computation of the concealed question NP
step by step:2
2. For simplicity, the internal computation of the embedded [IP Fred knows t5] is not shown.
Implementations (i) and (ii) would have to apply here as well, but, as they yield the same seman-
tic result, it is enough to illustrate them for matrix know. 
V′
know NPCQ
V′
know XP
ANS NPCQ
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In implementation (i), we combine the extension or intension of the NP with
the lexical entry of knowCQ in (31), where y is a variable of type <s,e> or
<s,<s,e>>. The two readings of (32) are obtained as follows. In reading A, the
extension of the NP at the evaluation world w –[[NP]]g(w), an intensional object
itself, of type <s,e>– is fed as the argument of know, as shown in (33):3
(31) [[knowCQ]] = λyλxeλw. ∀w′∈Doxx(w) [ y(w′) = y(w) ]
(32) John knows the price that Fred knows.
(33) Reading A:
a. Extension of NP in w:
íx<s,e> [ price(x,w) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w) [x(w′′′) = x(w)] ]
b. Know + extension of the NP:
λw. ∀w′∈Doxj(w) 
[ íx<s,e> [price(x,w) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w) [x(w′′′) = x(w)]] (w′) =
íx<s,e> [price(x,w) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w) [x(w′′′) = x(w)]] (w) ]
3. The meaning of know that combines with the NP’s extension (33a) to yield (33b) is slightly over-
simplified in the text for expository purposes. Technically, we would need to assume that all natu-
ral language predicates –including the matrix know– come with a free world index that is later
bound by some higher operator (see Farkas 1993, Percus 2000). Since we use the NP’s extension
in the actual (topmost) world, formal expressions corresponding to the predicates within the NP
–price(x,w) and Doxfred(w)–  get the same topmost world variable w as formal expressions corre-
sponding to the matrix know –Doxj(w).
NP λw′′. ιx<s,e> [ price(x,w′′) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w′′) [x(w′′′) = x(w′′)] ]
λP<<s,e>,<s,t>>λw′′. the N′ λx<s,e>λw′′. price(x,w′′) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w′′) [x(w′′′) = x(w′′)]
ιx<s,e> [ P(x)(w′′) ]
λx<s,e>λw′′. price(x,w′′) price CP λx<s,e>λw′′. ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w′′) [ x(w′′′) = x(w′′) ]
that5 IP λw′′.∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w′′) [g(5)(w′′′) = g(5)(w′′)]
Fred VP
knows (ANS) t5 <s,e>
g(5)
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world w such that the unique price x<s,e> that Fred knows the value of in w is such
that John too knows the value of x<s,e> in w. Reading A is correctly rendered by
these truth-conditions.
In reading B, know takes the intension of the NP –[[NP]]g, of type <s,<s,e>>–,
as shown in (34):
(34) Reading B: 
a. Intension of the NP:
λw′′. íx<s,e> [ price(x,w′′) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w′′) [x(w′′′) = x(w′′)] ]
b. Know + intension of the NP:
λw. ∀w′∈Doxj(w) 
[ λw′′. íx<s,e> [price(x,w′′) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w′′) [x(w′′′) = x(w′′)]] (w′) =
λw′′. íx<s,e> [price(x,w′′) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w′′) [x(w′′′) = x(w′′)]] (w) ]
c. Simplification:
λw. ∀w′∈Doxj(w) 
[ íx<s,e> [price(x,w′) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w′) [x(w′′′) = x(w′)]] =
íx<s,e> [price(x,w) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w) [x(w′′′) = x(w)]] ]
The resulting truth-conditions in (34c) roughly state the following: we are in
a world w such that, in all of John’s doxastic alternatives w′ in w, the price x<s,e> that
Fred knows in w′ is exactly the price x<s,e> that Fred knows in the actual world w.
This correctly captures reading B.
Implementation (ii) involves separating the semantic content in (31) into two dif-
ferent lexical entries: a simpler lexical entry for know and an answer operator ANS.4
4. This type of division of semantic labor is proposed in the literature for know plus interrogative
clauses (Heim (1994), Beck-Rullmann (1999)). The insight behind it is that know, remember,
guess, etc., can all have a strongly exhaustive reading, as in (i), and a mention-some reading, as
illustrated in (ii). One can build the two degrees of exhaustivity into each verb (having two lexical
entries for each verb, or perhaps a basic entry and a fixed algorithm to derive the second); or one
can propose two operators ANSSTR and ANSSOME separate from the verb that determine the degree
of exhaustivity in each sentence. In CQs, the same degrees or exhaustivity can be found, as illus-
trated in (iii)-(iv) for Catalan, and again the different degrees of exhaustivity can be built into ANS
operators separate from the verb.
(i) John knows / remembers / guessed what students came.
‘For all students x that came, John knows that x came, and for all students x that did not 
come, John knows that x did not come.’
(ii) John knows / remembers/ guessed where one can buy Spanish ham in Philadelphia.
‘For some place x in Philadelphia, John knows that one can buy Spanish ham in x.’
(iii) Sé els nens que van venir.
I-know the kids that AUX come.
‘I know the kids that came’, meaning ‘For all kids x that came, I know that x came, and for 
all the kids x that did not come, I know that x did not come’.
(iv) Sé / Et diré el professor que (també) et pot ajudar.
I-know / To-you I-will-tell the professor that (also) you-Acc can help
‘I know / I’ll tell you the professor that (also) can help you’, meaning ‘For some professor x 
that can help you, I know / I’ll tell you that x (also) can help you’.
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(strongly exhaustive) answer operator ANS is defined in (36), where y is a variable
of type <s,e> or <s,<s,e>>:
(35) [[know]] = λp<s,<s,t>λxeλw. ∀w′∈Doxx(w) [p(w)(w′)=1]
(36) ANS (y) = λwλw′. y(w′) = y(w)
The ambiguity between reading A and reading B obtains as follows. In reading
A, ANS applies to the extension of the NP in the evaluation world w, and
ANS([[NP]]g(w)) is then fed as the argument of know:
(37) John knows the price that Fred knows.
(38) Reading A:
a. Extension of NP in w:
íx<s,e> [ price(x,w) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w) [x(w′′′) = x(w)] ]
b. ANS +  extension of the NP:5
ANS ( [[NP]]g(w) )   =
λw*λw′.  íx<s,e> [price(x,w) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w) [x(w′′′) = x(w)]]  (w′) =
íx<s,e> [price(x,w) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w) [x(w′′′) = x(w)]]  (w*)
c. Know +  ANS ([[NP]]g(w)):
λw. ∀w′∈Doxj(w) 
[ íx<s,e> [price(x,w) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w) [x(w′′′) = x(w)]] (w′) =
íx<s,e> [price(x,w) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w) [x(w′′′) = x(w)]] (w) ]
In reading B, ANS applies to the intension of the NP, and ANS([[NP]]g) is the
argument of know:
(39) Reading B: 
a. Intension of the NP:
λw′′. íx<s,e> [ price(x,w′′) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w′′) [x(w′′′) = x(w′′)] ]
b. ANS +  intension of the NP:
ANS ( [[NP]]g )   =
λwλw′. [λw′′. íx<s,e>[price(x,w′′) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w′′) [x(w′′′) = 
x(w′′)]]] (w′) =
[λw′′. íx<s,e> [price(x,w′′) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w′′) [x(w′′′) = 
x(w′′)]]] (w)
5. In (38b), I use the alphabetical variant (i) of the ANS operator (36) in order to avoid accidental bind-
ing of the free variable w in (38a). For the combination of (38b) with matrix [[know]] to yield
(38c), see footnote 3.
(i) ANS (y) = λw*λw′. y(w′) = y(w*)
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λwλw′. íx<s,e>[price(x,w′) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w′) [x(w′′′) = x(w′)]] =
íx<s,e> [price(x,w) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w) [x(w′′′) = x(w)]] 
d. Know +  ANS ([[NP]]g):
λw. ∀w′∈Doxj(w) 
[ íx<s,e> [price(x,w′) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w′) [x(w′′′) = x(w′)]] =
íx<s,e> [price(x,w) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w) [x(w′′′) = x(w)]] ]
Both implementations lead to the exact same formulae, i.e., to the same final truth
conditions for reading A on the one hand and reading B on the other. The only dif-
ference involves what the argument of know is: the NP itself, as represented in
(28), or a complex phrase containing ANS and the NP, as in (29).
In sum, we have seen that the ambiguity between reading A and reading B fol-
lows from the intensionality of know. Like other intensional verbs needing an inten-
sional object as their argument, know can derive this intensional object from the
extension (reading A) or from the intension of the NP (reading B). In implementation
(i), this intensional object directly corresponds to the extension/intension of the
NP. In implementation (ii), this intensional object is the result of applying ANS to
the extension/intension of the NP.
2.3. The ambiguity in SSs
We have seen that the ambiguity observed for CQs stems from the intensionality of
know. This predicts that no such ambiguity should arise when we have the same
nested NP structure with purely extensional verbs, like touch or be cheap/expen-
sive. This prediction is borne out, as shown in (40)-(41).
(40) John touched the price that Fred touched.
(41) The price that they thought was cheap was (actually) expensive.
Crucially, SSs with specificational be display readings parallel to reading A
and reading B of CQs with know. In the same way that a given concealed question
NP can contribute a question or a meta-question, so can a given specificational
subject NP –e.g. [NP the price that Fred thought was $1.29]— ambiguously con-
tribute a question or a meta-question. After the copula, the answer to that question
or meta-question is enunciated, and this naturally disambiguates the reading. The
example and paraphrase in (42)-(43) illustrate reading A and (44)-(45) exemplify
reading B:
(42) The price that Fred thought was $1.29 was (actually) $1.79.
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real answer ‘$1.79’.’
There are several relevant questions about prices: «How much is the milk?»
«How much is the oil?»
«How much is the ham?»
For one of these questions –e.g., the first one—, Fred thought the answer was 
‘$1.29’.
But the actual answer to this question is ‘$1.79’.
(44) The price that Fred thought was $1.29 was the price of milk.
(45) Reading B: ‘The question whose answer Fred thought was ‘$1.29’ is ‘How 
much is the milk?’.’
There are several relevant questions about prices: «How much is the milk?»
«How much is the oil?»
«How much is the ham?»
For one of these questions, Fred thought the answer was ‘$1.29’.
Then, there is the «meta-question» asking which of these questions is the one 
whose answer Fred thought was $1.29.
The answer to the meta-question is «How much is the milk?».
That is, Fred thought that the price of milk was $1.29.
The possibility of having reading A and reading B in SSs is attested in other
languages, like Catalan (in (46)-(47)) and German ((48)-(49)): 6
(46) El regal que pensàvem que seria un cotxe va ser una
The present that we-thought that would-be a car AUX be a
carbassa.
pumpkin
‘The present that we thought would be a car was a pumpkin.’
6. To ensure that copular sentences with the A/B ambiguity are specificational, Romero (2003) pro-
vides the following examples with variable binding connectivity:
(i) Scenario for (ii)-(iii): 
A group of 2-year old girls from the Ukraine was given in adoption to several families in
Barcelona. The director of the adoption program encouraged the biological relatives of each
girl to keep in touch with her by writing letters, telling them though that they should not iden-
tify themselves using their name, family relationship or address. After a couple of years, the
girls have developed some hypotheses about who every secret writer may or may not be. For
example, no girl thinks that the one who writes to her the least can possibly be her mother.
In fact, they are all right about that, since, for every girl, the one who writes to her the least is
her uncle.
(ii) The anonymous writer that no girl1 thinks can possibly be her1 mother is (in fact) her1 uncle.  
READING A
(iii) The anonymous writer that no girl1 thinks can possibly be her1 mother is the one who writes 
to her1 the least.
READING B
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The present that we-thought that would-be a car was the that
va portar la Bombi.
AUX bring the Bombi
‘The present that we thought would be a car was the one that Bombi brought.’
(48) Der Preis, von dem Hans glaubte, dass er $1.29 war, war in
The-masc price of which Hans believed that he $1.29 was was in
Wirklichkeit $1.79.
reality $1.79
‘The price that Hans thought was $1.29 was in reality $1.79.’
(49) Der Preis, von dem Hans glaubte, dass er $1.29 war, war
The-masc price of which Hans believed that he $1.29 was was
der Milchpreis.
the milk-price
‘The price that Hans thought was $1.29 was the price of milk.’
Given that the ambiguity found in CQs is exactly parallel to the readings found
in SSs, a unified account of the ambiguity is desirable. In the same way that know
is an intensional verb taking an intensional object as its semantic argument, speci-
ficational be is an intensional verb taking an intensional object as its (subject)
semantic argument. As with know, reading A obtains when this intensional object
arises from the extension of the SS and reading B obtains when it arises from the
intension of the SS, as sketched in (50):
(50) The price that Fred thought was $1.29 was …
a. Reading A: EXTENSION of [NP the price that Fred thought was $1.29]  +  
[[be …]]
b. Reading B: INTENSION of [NP the price that Fred thought was $1.29]  +  
[[be …]]
Again, this idea can be pursued through implementation (i) or through imple-
mentation (ii). In either case, the semantic computation of the SS is as spelled out
in (51):7
7. For simplicity, the semantic value of the embedded CP [CP t5 was $1.29] is spelled out as λw.
g(5)(w) = $1.29 for both implementations. The differences between the two implementations will
be illustrated only for matrix be.
160 CatJL 3, 2004 Maribel Romero
Cat.Jour.Ling. 3 001-182  10/9/04  13:27  Página 160(51) [[the price that Fred thought was $1.29]]g =
In implementation (i), specificational be has the meaning in (52), where y may
be of type <s,e> and <s,<s,e>>, and z –with one degree less of intensionality–
may have the type e or <s,e>. The semantic contribution of the SS combines directly
with [[I′]], as made explicit in the syntactic representation (53). Note, further, than
the post-verbal constituent is an NP (as in Jacobson (1994), Sharvit (1999), Cecchetto
(2000), Heller (2002)). When the SS contributes its extension, reading A arises,
as shown in (54). When the SS contributes its intension, we obtain reading B, as
indicated in (55).
(52) [[be]] = λzλyλw
s
. y(w) = z
(54) Reading A: 
a. Extension of NP in w:
íx<s,e> [price(x,w) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w) [x(w′′′) = $1.29]]
b. Extension of the NP + [[be…]]
λw. [ íx [price(x,w) & ∀w′′′∈Dox (w) [x(w′′′) = $1.29]] (w) = $1.79 ]
NP λw′′. ιx<s,e> [ price(x,w′′) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w′′) [x(w′′′) = $1.29] ]
λP<<s,e>,<s,t>>λw′′. the N′ λx<s,e>λw′′. price(x,w′′) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w′′) [x(w′′′) = $1.29]
íx<s,e> [ P(x)(w′′) ]
λx<s,e>λw′′. price(x,w′′) price CP λx<s,e>λw′′. ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w′′) [ x(w′′′) = $1.29]
that5 IP λw′′.∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w′′) [g(5)(w′′′) = $1.29]
Fred VP
λp<s,t>λzeλw′′. ∀w′′′∈Doxz(w′′) [p(w′′′) = 1] thought CP λw. g(5)(w) = $1.29
t5 <s,e> was $1.29
(53) IP
NPSS I′
be NP<s,e> fred
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a. Intension of NP:
λw′′. íx<s,e> [price(x,w′′) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w′′) [x(w′′′) = $1.29]]
b. Intension of the NP + [[be …]]
λw. [  λw′′. íx<s,e> [price(x,w′′) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w′′) [x(w′′′) = 
$1.29]] (w) = íx<s,e> [price-of-milk(x,w)] ]
c. Simplification:
λw. [  íx<s,e> [price(x,w) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w) [x(w′′′) = $1.29]]= 
íx<s,e> [price-of-milk(x,w)] ]
We turn now to implementation (ii).8 Here the complex ANS([[SS]]g) is the argu-
ment of be, as shown in (56). ANS is the same answer operator that we used with
CQs in (36), repeated here as (57), where y can have type <s,e> or <s,<s,e>>. This
means that the pre-verbal semantic argument of be must be a propositional con-
cept (type <s,<s,t>>), and that the post-verbal semantic argument must corre-
spondingly be a proposition (type <s,t>), as specified in the lexical entry in (58). 
(57) ANS(y) = λwλw′. y(w′) = y(w)
(58) [[be]] = λq<s,t>λp<s,<s,t>>λw. p(w) = q
8. The same flexibility in degrees of exhaustivity observed in footnote 4 for full interrogative clauses
and for CQs is present in SSs, witness the Catalan examples (i)-(ii). Example (i) is more natural-
ly read as giving the (strongly) exhaustive list of the kids that came. Example (ii) has a mention-
some reading according the which the speaker is suggesting a particular professor as a possible
source of help, without committing herself to whether or not this is the only professor that may
provide help. Again, this flexibility brings up the possibility of severing the degree of exhaustivi-
ty from the verb be and treating it as a separate ANS operator, as done in implementation (ii).
(i) Els nens que van venir van ser el Pere, la Núria i la Raquel.
The kids that AUX come AUX be the Pere, the Núria and the Raquel.
‘The kids that came were Pere, Núria i Raquel.’
(ii) El professor que (també) et pot ajudar és el Quetglas.
The professor that (also) to-you can help is the Quetglas.
‘The professor that (also) can help you is Quetglas.’
(56) IP
XP<s,<s,t>> I′
ANS NPSS be YP<s,t>
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copular constituent is not a simple NP but rather a clause that has undergone partial
deletion, as suggested in Ross (1972), den Dikken et al. (2000), Ross (2000) and
Schlenker (2003). Under this analysis, an example like (59a) has the underlying
structure in (59b), and example (60a) has the structure in (60b), where the post-
copular [YP  the price of milk $1.79] can be understood as a verbless clause (see
Schlenker 2003), comparable to a Small Clause:
(59) a. What he ate was potatoes.
b. What he ate was [IP he ate potatoes]
(60) a. The price of milk is $1.79.
b. The price of milk is [YP the price of milk $1.79]
We now apply this syntactic and semantic analysis to the examples of reading
A and reading B at issue. Reading A has the underlying structure in (61), where
the deleted predicate P in the post-copular constituent stands for the (predicatio-
nal) property of being the actual value of the price x<s,e> that Fred thinks is $1.29.(62) sketches the semantic computation:9
(61) The price that Fred thought was $1.29 is P $1.79.
(62) Reading A: 
a. Extension of NP in w:
íx<s,e> [price(x,w) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w) [x(w′′′) = $1.29]]
b. ANS + extension of the NP:10
ANS ( [[NP]]g(w) )   =
λw*λw′. íx<s,e> [price(x,w) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w) [x(w′′′) = $1.29]]  (w′) =
íx<s,e> [price(x,w) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w) [x(w′′′) = $1.29]]  (w*)
c. ANS ([[NP]]g(w))   +  [[be …]]:
λw [  λw′ [íx<s,e> [price(x,w) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w) [x(w′′′) = $1.29]]  (w′) =
íx<s,e> [price(x,w) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w) [x(w′′′) = $1.29]]  (w)  ]
=  λw′. P($1.79, w′)  ]
The final proposition in (62c) can be roughly paraphrased as in (63). This propo-
sition correctly captures the truth conditions of reading A:
9. The expression λw′.P($1.79, w′) in (62c) is used to reflect the predication within the verbless
clause [YP P $1.79].
10. See footnote 5 for the step (62b), and apply the content of footnote 3 to matrix be for the step
(62c).
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‘We are in a world w such that: the unique price x<s,e> in w that Fred thinks
has the value $1.29, and the actual value x
e
of x<s,e> in w are such that: the
proposition «the value of x<s,e> equals xe» is the same as the proposition «$1.79
has the property of being the value of x<s,e>».’
Reading B is represented and computed in (64)-(65):
(64) The price that Fred thought was $1.29 was Fred thought the price of milk was
$1.29.
(65) Reading B: 
a. Intension of NP:
λw′′. íx<s,e> [price(x,w′′) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w′′) [x(w′′′) = $1.29]]
b. ANS + intension of the NP:
ANS ( [[NP]]g )   =
λwλw′. [λw′′. íx<s,e>[price(x,w′′) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w′′) [x(w′′′) = 
$1.29]]] (w′) =
[λw′′. íx<s,e> [price(x,w′′) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w′′) [x(w′′′) = 
$1.29]]] (w)
c. Simplification:
λwλw′. íx<s,e>[price(x,w′) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w′) [x(w′′′) = $1.29]] =  
íx<s,e> [price(x,w) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w) [x(w′′′) = $1.29]] 
d. ANS ([[NP]]g)   +  [[be …]]:
λw [ λw′[íx<s,e>[price(x,w′) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w′) [x(w′′′) = $1.29]] =  
íx<s,e> [price(x,w) & ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w) [x(w′′′) = $1.29]] ]
=  λw′. ∀w′′′∈Doxfred(w′) [ price-of-milk(w′′′) = $1.29 ]  ]
The final proposition in (65d) is paraphrased in (66). This proposition (rough-
ly) corresponds to the truth-conditions of reading B:
(66) ‘We are in a world w such that: the unique price x<s,e> in w that Fred thinks
has the value $1.29 is such that the proposition «the price that Fred thinks has
the value $1.29 equals x<s,e>» is the same as the proposition «Fred thinks the
price of milk has the value $1.29».’11
11. For the proposition in (65d) to exactly represent reading B, we need to amend the presuppositional
mismatch between the first embedded proposition  “the price that Fred thinks has the value $1.29
equals x<s,e>” –which presupposes that there is a unique price that Fred thinks has the value $1.29—,
and the second embedded proposition “Fred thinks the price of milk has the value $1.29” –which
does not carry this presupposition. Perhaps focal stress on the remnant the price of milk and the
exhaustivity implicature resulting from it can be exploited to ensure this matching, along the lines
suggested in Schlenker (2003).
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We have seen that the ambiguity that Heim (1979) detected for CQs with know
also arises in SS with be, and that this ambiguity does not arise with NPs in exten-
sional contexts. A unified intensional analysis of the two constructions has been
presented following Romero (2003), and two possible implementations –(i)  and
(ii)– have been spelled out to cover the examples at hand. Although both imple-
mentations derive appropriate truth-conditions for readings A and B, they differ in
interesting ways in the manner they achieve them. Implementation (i) combines
the contribution of the CQ/SS directly with the verb, and it assumes that the post-
copular constituent is entirely overt (just an NP in the examples above). In imple-
mentation (ii), the answer operator ANS mediates between the CQ/SS and the verb,
and the post-copular constituent is a partially elided clause. 
The question then arises whether there is any empirical evidence to favor one
implementation over the other. In the next section, three sets of data will be pre-
sented that further argue for a unified account of CQs and SSs and that offer sup-
port for implementation (ii). The choice of implementation has consequences for
the syntax of the post-copular phrase and thus for the explanation of connectivity
effects, which we will briefly discuss in the conclusions.
3. Data in support of implementation (ii)
3.1. Pronominalization
Gender marking in English is based on the referential properties of the NP. Pronouns
referring to an extensional individual x
e
typically appear in the gender corresponding
to that individual in the world: in feminine if the referent is a human female, in
masculine if the referent is a human male, and in neuter form (roughly) otherwise.
This is illustrated in (67), where the boldface pronoun and the NP in the preced-
ing clause are intended as correferential:
(67) a. The girl who caused the trouble was smart. She / *he / *it didn’t get caught
until much later.
b. The winner of the Oscar for best actress walked in. She / *he / *it was
wearing a red dress.
It has been observed that pronominalization of English SSs differs in this
respect (Higgins 1976, Heycock-Kroch 1999; see also Büring 1998 for German,
Mikkelsen 2003 for Danish). To refer to the semantic value of a given SS, the
neuter form of the pronoun must be used, disregarding the gender that the full-
fledged version of the NP is usually linked to. In other words, the semantic con-
tribution of a SS cannot be referred to by she or he, but it must be referred to by
it, as illustrated in (68):
(68) The girl who caused the trouble wasn’t Mary.   It / *She was Jane.
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lization of SSs holds for CQs:
(69) John guessed the winner of the Oscar for best actress before I guessed it / *her.
This observation argues for a unified account of CQs and SSs that sets them
apart from regular NPs in extensional contexts, as proposed in section 2.
Furthermore, because implementation (i) and (ii) differ in the structure and seman-
tic value of the argument of know/be, data on pronominalization also favor one
implementation over the other. We now examine the predictions of each imple-
mentation.
According to implementation (i), the concealed question NP and the specifi-
cational subject NP provide an intensional object –of type <s,e> or <s,<s,e>>– that
combines directly with their intensional verbs, as in (70). In this respect, CQs with
know and SSs with be are exactly like the argument of look for or like an inten-
sional pronoun in regular intensional contexts. Hence, CQs/SSs and regular
intensional NPs are expected to pattern together.
(70) Implementation (i):
In contrast, in implementation (ii) the CQ/SS forms a new constituent with ANS,
and the semantic value of this new constituent is a propositional concept (type
<s,<s,t>>), as indicated in (71). Under this account, the syntax-semantics of the
intensional verbs know and be is more complicated than that of regular intensio-
nal verbs, as there is an extra propositional layer, provided by ANS, between those
verbs and the corresponding NPs. Thus, in implementation (ii), CQs/SSs are not
expected to pattern together with regular intensional NPs.
(71) Implementation (ii):
a. V′
know NPCQ
<s,e> / <s,<s,e>>
b. IP
NPSS I′
<s,e> / <s,<s,e>>
be NP
b. IP
XP<s,<s,t>> I′
ANS NPCQ be YP<s,t>
<s,e> / <s,<s,e>>
a. V′
know XP<s,<s,t>>
ANS NPCQ
<s,e> / <s,<s,e>>
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when a pronoun expresses an individual concept in intensional contexts other than
question environments and specificational sentences, can it be marked for different
genders? Or must it always appear in neuter form? Pronouns standing for inten-
sional individuals in regular intensional environments are marked for gender, con-
trary to CQs and SSs. This is shown in (72)-(73):12
(72) Scenario: John wants to find the girl who caused the trouble, whoever that
may be. The same holds for Mark.
John is looking for the girl who caused the trouble, and Mark is looking for *it
/ her too.
(73) Scenario: all the employees at issue are unmarried, unengaged, and have only
de dicto desires about their future wives, whoever they may be.
Every employee1 at the First Union Bank dreams of taking his1 future wife
to the Bahamas, and every employee at Mellon Bank dreams of taking *it /
her to Hawaii.
The contrast between CQs and SSs on the one hand and regular intensional
NPs on the other is easily accounted for under implementation (ii) in the following
way. Referents that are proposition-like are pronominalized invariably in the neuter
form; referents that are individual-like are pronominalized with different gender
markings. The argument of know and be is propositional in nature. In the same
way that a proposition is referred to by a neuter pronoun, as shown in (74), the
propositional concepts ANS([[CQ]]) and ANS([[SS]]) must be referred to by neuter
it. In the same way that an individual must be referred to with the appropriate gen-
der pronoun, as we saw in (67), the corresponding individual concept must be
referred to with the same gender pronoun, as (72)-(73) showed.
(74) Rosa heard [that Ramon was coming] from her father. Valen heard it from
her mother.
Implementation (i), instead, leaves the contrast between CQs/SSs and regular
intensional NPs completely unexplained. In all cases, the pronoun stands for an inten-
sionalized individual. It is not clear why this intensionalized individual should be
referred to by it in CQ and SS environments but by a she(/he) in other intensional
contexts. 
The observed pronominalization pattern is not an accident of English. It also
obtains in other languages, like Finnish, where gender marking is referentially
based. Finnish distinguishes only between human (hän ‘he/she’) and non-human (se
12. That pronouns standing for (regular) individual concepts are marked for gender is also noted in
Heycock-Kroch (2002), who provide the following example:
(i) In the early days of the church the pope was very poor, but in the 18th and 19th centuries he/*it
was typically very rich indeed.
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the human form of the pronoun, hän ‘he/she’. The example (76) shows that a SS
must be pronominalized with the non-human se ‘it’. Example (77) shows that the
meaning of a CQ is also referred back to with the non-human form. Example (78)
shows that, when the pronoun stands for an individual concept over human indi-
viduals in a regular intensional environment, the human form hänet ‘she/he-ACC’
must be used.
(75) Naispääosa-Oscarin voittaja astui sisään.
Female-lead-Oscar-GEN winner-NOM stepped/walked in.
Hän oli pukeutunut punaiseen pukuun.
She/he-NOM was dressed red-ILLATIVE evening-dress-ILLATIVE
‘The winner of the Oscar for best actress walked in. She was wearing a red
dress.’
(76) Tyttö joka aiheutti tämän ongelman ei ollut Mari.
Girl-NOM who caused this-ACC problem neg was Mari-NOM. 
Se / # hän oli Liisa.
It-NOM / # she/he was Liisa-NOM
‘The girl who caused this problem was not Mari. It / #she was Liisa.’13
(77) Jussi arvasi naispääosa-Oscarin voittajan ennen kuin 
Jussi-NOM guessed female-lead-Oscar-GEN winner-ACC before(2words)
Maria arvasi sen.
Maria-NOM guessed it-ACC
‘Jussi guessed the winner of the best lead actress Oscar before Maria guessed
it.’
(78) Jokainen työntekijä First Union Bankissa haaveilee
Every-NOM worker-NOM First Union Bank-INESSIVE dreams-of
vievänsä tulevan vaimonsa Bahamasaarille ja
taking coming-ACC wife-ACC Baham-islands-ALLATIVE and
jokainen työntekijä Mellon Bankissa haaveilee vievänsä
every-NOM worker-NOM Mellon Bank-INESSIVE dreams-of taking
hänet Havaijille.
she/he-ACC Hawaii-ALL
‘Every employee at the First Union Bank dreams of taking his future wife to
the Bahamas, and every employee at Mellon Bank dreams of taking her to
Hawaii.’
13. From my informant’s judgements, it seems that hän ‘she’ can be used in some variants of (76) in
which the speaker wants to refer to the actual person who caused the trouble. In (76) itself, though,
hän ‘she’ is very awkward and se ‘it’ must be used, as in English.
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have shown that CQs and SSs pattern together with respect to pronominalization,
differing both from extensional NPs and from intensional NPs in regular inten-
sional contexts.14 Hence, this empirical pattern argues for a unified account of CQs
and SSs that sets them apart semantically from any other type of NP. This is achieved
by implementation (ii), but not by implementation (i).15
14. In languages where gender is merely grammatically based, pronouns take whichever grammati-
cal gender the corresponding NP has, regardless of its referential properties, as illustrated in (i)
for German. This means that no difference is expected between extensional and regular intensional
NPs on the one hand and SSs and CQs on the other. In effect, German makes no difference in the
pronominalization of extensional NPs, regular intensional NPs and CQs, all of which take the gram-
matical gender of the corresponding NP, as (i)-(iii) show. However, as noted in Büring (1998), a spec-
ificational sentence of the form [Pronoun + be + name] in German can only have the neuter form
of the pronoun in subject position, as illustrated in (iv). Büring argues that es ‘it’ in this sentence
does not stand for the preceding SS, but that this clause is a reduced cleft (cf. ‘It was Jane that
caused the trouble.’). I leave a more in-depth examination of this issue for future research.
(i) I habe meine Tasche verloren. Hast du sie gesehen?
I have my-FEM bag-FEM lost. Have you her-FEM seen?
‘I lost my bag. Have you seen it?’
(ii) Jeder Mitarbeiter von Microsoft träumt davon, seine zukünftige Frau auf die
Each worker from Microsoft dreams that-of his future wife to the
Bahamas mizunehmen, und jeder Angestellte von TRADOS träumt davon, sie
Bahamas to-take and each employee from TRADOS dreams that-of her
nach Hawaii mitzunehmen.
to Hawaii to-take
‘Each worker from Microsoft dreams of taking his future wife to the Bahamas, and each
employee from TRADOS dreams of taking her to Hawaii.’
(iii) Tobi hat die Gewinnerin erraten, bevor Jens sie erraten hat.
Tobi has the-fem winner-FEM guessed before Jens her-FEM guessed has
‘Tobi guessed the winner-FEM before Jens guessed it(FEM).’
(iv) Die, die Ärger gemacht hat, war nicht Claudi, es / *sie war Simone.
This that-REL anger made has was not Claudi it / *she was Simone
‘The one who caused the trouble was not Claudi, it / *she was Simone.’
15. A reviewer points out that, since the post-copular XP in implementation (ii) is of propositional
type (see diagram in (71)), one may expect that pronouns in post-copular position must be neuter,
contrary to what we observe in example (i). However, as we saw in subsection 2.3, the semantic
analysis given in implementation (ii) must be coupled with a syntactic representation where the
post-verbal constituent is a partially elided clause, as illustrated in (ii). Adopting this syntactic
structure, implementation (ii) makes the right prediction that the feminine pronoun her should be
allowed. The question remains as to why the neuter pronoun it is completely out, since the post-ver-
bal clause –whether partially deleted or not– should in principle be able to pronominalize in neuter
form in the structure in (iii). Let me point out, though, that this unsolved problem is independent
of the present analysis of SSs, since it also obtains in question/answer pairs like (iv).
(i) We didn’t believe that the girl Bob wanted to date was Mary, and in fact it was her/*it.
(ii) … [the girl Bob wanted to date]2 was [Bob wanted to date Mary1].  It2 was  [Bob wanted to
date her1/*it1].
(iii) … [the girl Bob wanted to date]2 was [Bob wanted to date Mary1 ]3.  It2 was  *it3.
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Coordination of a verb taking a CQ –e.g., know or guess– with an extensional verb
is deviant. This is illustrated in (79), which sounds like a play on words (in fact,
like a zeugma):
(79) * John guessed and kissed the winner of the Oscar for best actress.
Interestingly, specificational be is also illicit in coordination with an exten-
sional predicate like have too much self-confidence. Example (80) is judged ungram-
matical:
(80) * The person (/Who) John1 admires the most is himself1 and has too much
self-confidence.
The fact that neither know nor be can share an argument with an extensional
verb already argues for a unified analysis of know and be that differentiates them
for extensional verbs. But, besides that, coordination brings support for imple-
mentation (ii) over implemenation (i). Consider (81), an example in which a syn-
tactic node containing a regular intensional verb, look for, is coordinated with a
syntactic node containing the extensional verb find. The sentence is perfectly gram-
matical under the de dicto reading:
(81) John is looking for but will not find a (/the best) secretary that speaks seven lan-
guages.
Sentence (81) shows that, although look for requires and intensional argument
and find expects an extensional individual, the two verbs can share their argument
in a coordinated structure.16 Presumably, some type-shifting operation is able to
relate the intensionalized individual of look for (a property in Zimmermann (1992),
an intensional generalized quantifier in Moltmann (1997), or perhaps an individual
(iv) Scenario: A is asking the same question to several people, one after the other.
A (to B): Which girl does Bob want to date?
B: [IP Bob wants to date Mary1 ]3
A (to C): Which girl does Bob want to date?
C: [IP Bob wants to date her1]      
* It3.
16. Example (81) has the syntactic representation in (i). We see that two functional projections are
conjoined, and that the direct object [NP a (/the best) secretary that speaks seven languages] is
Right-Node Raised in an A(cross)-T(he)-B(oard) fashion, leaving behind two traces t1 that are
exactly alike. Hence, semantically, the verbs look for and find share the same argument because
they both apply to the semantic value of t1. A regular intensional verb and an extensional verb can
of course also share the same semantic subject, as shown in (ii). 
(i) S-Str: John [ [FP is looking for t1] but [FP will not find t1] ]  [a (/the best) secretary that speaks
seven languages]1. 
(ii) A secretary that speaks seven languages was sought but not found.
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CQs/SSs and extensional verbs impossible?
Implementation (ii) offers a line of explanation: the semantic argument of know
and be is not an intensionalized individual, but a propositional concept. Whereas the
difference between an intensionalized individual and an extensional individual can
be overcome in (81), the difference between a proposition-like object and an exten-
sional individual cannot be salvaged in (79)-(80). The argument of an extensional
verb and the argument of know/be are simply too different in nature: the former is
individual-like, the latter is propositional.
Under implementation (i), instead, the pattern in (79)-(81) is hard to explain.
Take, for instance, the definite version of (81) John is looking for but will not find
the best secretary that speaks seven languages. The NP the best secretary that
speaks seven languages must provide a property <e,<s,t>> as the argument of look
for (following Zimmermann (1992)), and at the same time it must provide a plain
individual of type e as the argument of find. If the difference between a property
and an extensional individual can be overcome in (81), it is not clear why the dif-
ference between an individual concept <s,e> and the corresponding extensional
individual of type e cannot be overlooked in (79)-(80).
This coordination pattern is not an accident of English, but it is supported by
crosslinguistic data from German, Finnish and Russian. In German, (82) sounds
as if the speaker is trying to be funny or unexpected. Example (83) is ungramma-
tical without the subject er ‘he’. That is, VP coordination is impossible in (83);
two full sentences must be coordinated, the second one of which has the pronoun
er ‘he’ referring to Rudi as its subject. Coordination of (verbal projections of) sucht
‘seeks’ and findet ‘finds’ is allowed, as in (84).
(82) ?? John hat die Gewinnerin vorhergesagt und geküsst .
John has the-fem winner predicted and kissed
‘John predicted and kissed the winner.’
(83) Wen Rudi am meisten bewundert ist er selbst
Whom Rudi at most admires ist he self
und *(er) hat auch zuviel Selbstvertrauen.
and *(he) has also too-much self-confidence
‘(The person) whom Rudi admires the most is himself and *(he) has too much
self-confidence.’
(84) Der Jorge sucht und findet wahrscheinlich auch eine Sekretärin, 
The Jorge seeks and finds probably also a secretary
die sieben Sprachen spricht.
that seven languages speaks
‘Jorge is looking for and will probably also find a secretary that speaks seven
languages.’
Finnish also prohibits coordination of CQs/SSs with extensional verbs, as in
(85)-(86), while allowing for the coordination in (87):
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Jussi-NOM guessed and kissed female-lead-oscar-GEN winner-PART
‘John guessed and kissed the winner of the Oscar for best actress.’
(86) Se ketä Jussi ihailee eniten on hän itse,
It-NOM whom Jussi-NOM admired most is he-NOM self-NOM,
ja ?# (hän) on liian itsevarma.
and (she/he-NOM) is too self-confident
‘The one Jussi admires the most is himself and ?#(he) is too self-confident.’
(87) Jussi etsii, mutta ei tule löytämään, sihteeriä joka puhuu
Jussi seeks but not will find secretary that speaks
seitsemää kieltä.
seven languages
‘John is looking for but will not find a secretary that speaks seven languages.’
The same paradigm is found in Russian: (88) sounds like a joke, (89) is ill-
formed, and (90) is grammatical.
(88) # Vania ugadal i poceloval Oskarovskogo laureata premii luchshej
John guessed and kissed Oscar laureate of-award to-best
aktrise
actress
‘John guessed and kissed the winner of the Oscar for best actress.’
(89) *? Chelovek, kotorym Vania voshishchaets’a bol’she vsego eto on 
Person which-INSTR John admires most of-all this he
sam i slishkom uveren v sebe. 
self and too-much is-sure in self.
‘The person who John admires the most is himself and is too sure of him-
self.’
(90) Vania ishchet no ne najdet sekretaria, kotoryj by govoril na
John looks-for but not will-find secretary who would speak in
semi jazykah.
seven languages
‘John is looking for but will not find a secretary that speaks seven languages.’
In sum, crosslinguistic coordination data support a unified analysis of CQs and
SSs along the lines of implementation (ii).17
17. The three-fold coordination pattern cannot be fully tested in pro-drop languages like Catalan
because, in the corresponding SS example, like (i), one cannot tell whether we have coordination
of two VPs or coordination of two sentences with pro-drop of the second subject. Other than that,
the rest of the pattern is as in the examples in the text: CQs cannot be coordinated with extensional 
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Hirschbühler-Rivero (1983a) note that (regular) free relatives in Catalan and in
other languages must obey certain morpho-syntactic matching between the rela-
tive pronoun and the function of the entire free relative. Take the Catalan exam-
ples below. In (91), the relative pronoun qui ‘who’ and the entire free relative both
function as direct objects of their verbs. Matching is satisfied and the structure is
grammatical. The same happens in (92), where both the relative pronoun and the free
relative have the same syntactic function and the same prepositional marking. In
contrast, in (93), the relative pronoun is an adjunct PP whereas the free relative as
a whole functions as direct object; this mismatch of syntactic function and mor-
pho-syntactic marking leads to ungrammaticality.18
(91) Invito qui (/ la que) has invitat. (Hirschbühler-Rivero 1983a)
I-invite who (/ the that) you-have invited.
‘I invite (the person) who you have invited.’
verbs, as shown in (ii), and regular intensional verbs can share their argument with extensional
ones, as in (iii).
(i) La persona que el Joan admira més és ell mateix i (pro) té massa
The person that the Joan admires most is he himself and (pro) has too-much
conficança en si mateix.
confidence in SE himself.
‘The person Joan admires the most is himself and (pro) has too much self-condifence.’
(ii) * En Joan va endevinar i besar la guanyadora de l’òscar a la millor
The Joan AUX guess and kiss the winner of the-Oscar to the best
actriu.
actress
‘Joan guessed and kissed the winner of the Oscar for best actress.’
(iii) En Joan està buscant però no trobarà una secretària que parli
The Joan is looking-for but not will-find a secretary that speaks-SUBJ
set idiomes.
seven languages
‘Joan is looking for but will not find a secretary that speaks seven languages.’
18. A few clarifications are in order concerning the examples in this subsection. First, the original
examples (91) and (93) from Hirschbühler-Rivero (1983a) contain the relative pronoun qui ‘who’,
but the same holds for the free relative version with an overt article la ‘the’ and the relative pronoun
que ‘that’, as noted in the parentheses. Second, the intended pronunciation of the CQ examples
below places no stress on the relative pronouns qui ‘who’ (in (94)) and donde ‘where’ (in (100)),
to distinguish them from the stressed interrogative pronouns qui ‘who’ and dónde ‘where’. In both
cases, the version with the sequence ‘the’ + relative pronoun is also included, leading to the same
judgments. Finally, a reviewer points out that Hirschbühler-Rivero’s (1983) example in (95) sounds
odd. A parallel example that sounds completely natural to me is (i):
(i) No saps en el que t’estàs ficant.
Not you-know in the that REFL-you-are putting
‘You don’t know (the thing) into which you are getting yourself.’
I.e., ‘You don’t know what you are getting yourself into.’
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I-AUX dance with whom / the that I-AUX come.
‘I danced (with the person) with whom I came.’
(93) * Invito amb qui (/ la que) te n’aniràs. (Hirschbühler-Rivero 
1983a)
I-invite with whom (/ the that) REFL you-will-leave.
‘I invite (the person) with whom you’ll leave.’
Hirschbühler-Rivero (1983b) further note that free relatives functioning as CQs
are not subject to this matching requirement, witness the Catalan examples (94)-(95):
(94) Sé amb qui / la que te n’aniràs.
I-know with whom / the that REFL EN-you’ll-leave.
‘I know (epistemically) (the person) with whom you’ll leave.’ 
(95) Observa en lo que ens vam posar. (Hirschbühler-Rivero 1983b)
Observe in the that us we-AUX put
‘Observe the (situation) into which we got ourselves.’ 
I.e., ‘Observe what we got ourselves into.’
Interestingly, SSs pattern like CQs and unlike regular free relatives, that is, SSs
do not obey this matching requirement:19
(96) Amb qui / la que vaig ballar va ser amb la Joana.
With whom / the that I-AUX dance AUX be with the Joana.
‘(The person) with whom I danced was with Joana.’
(97) En qui / el que més has de pensar és en tu mateix.
In who / the that most you-have of think is in you self.
‘(The person) in whom you have to think most is in yourself.’
The same facts hold for Spanish. The free relative as a whole and the relative
pronoun itself must match morpho-syntactically if the free relative functions as an
argument of a regular extensional verb, as shown in (98)-(99). Matching between
the two is not necessary when the free relative functions as a CQ or as a SS, as
shown in (100)-(101):
19. Izvorski (2000) notes that, although regular free relatives in a topicalized position are not subject to
matching either, regular free relatives in a post-verbal subject position must obey matching. SSs are
free of matching effects regardless of whether they precede or follow the copula, as shown in (i):
(i) En tu mateix és en qui / el que més has de pensar.
In you self is in who / the that most you-have of think
‘Yourself is who you have to think of most.’
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I-invite A who / the that you-have invited.
‘I invite (the person) who you have invited.’
(99) * Invito con quien / la que has bailado.
I-invite with whom / the that you-have danced.
‘I invite (the person) with whom you danced.’
(100) No saben donde / en lo que se menten.
Not they-know where / in the that REFL they-put
‘They don’t know where / (the thing) into which they are putting them-
selves.’
I.e., ‘They don’t know what they are getting themselves into.’
(101) Con quien / la que bailé fue con Juana.
With whom / the that I-danced was with Joana.
‘(The person) with whom I danced was Joana.’
Hence, empirical data on Catalan and Spanish free relatives argue for a uni-
fied analysis of CQs and SSs that distinguishes them from the extensional NPs in
(91)-(93) and (98)-(99). 
But we can still go further. Data on free relatives and matching effects not only
argue for a unified analysis of CQs and SSs, they also support implementation (ii)
of this unified analysis over implementation (i). Take the Catalan example (102)
and in Spanish example (103), whose main verb is the regular intensional verb bus-
car ‘look for’. We see that free relatives that function as (regular) intensional objects
are subject to matching requirements too. This means, again, that CQs and SSs
must be differentiated not only from extensional NPs but also from regular inten-
sional NPs.
(102) * Està buscant per qui / la que has vingut.
He-is seeking for whom / the that you-have come
‘He is seeking (the person) for whom you have come.’
(103) * Está buscando con quien / la que has bailado.20
He-is seeking with whom / the that you-have danced
‘He is seeking (the person) with whom you danced.’
This goal can be achieved under implementation (ii). In extensional and regu-
lar intensional free relatives, the relative pronoun receives case or prepositional
marking from its own verb, and at the same time it inherits the case or preposi-
20. Example (103) is acceptable with stressed quién ‘who’, since then the verb buscar ‘look for’ can
also take an interrogative clause complement, meaning ‘He is looking up (e.g. on a list) who you
have danced with’. Similarly for (102).
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disagree, the syntactic structure is ill-formed, as in (93), (99) and (102)-(103). But,
in the case of CQs and SSs, the argument of the matrix verb know or be is
ANS([[NP]]), which is a propositional argument. If clause-like constituents are
exempt from case, or if we assume that the extra layer of structure introduced by ANS
blocks case percolation, we can explain why no case marking conflict ever arises
with CQs and SSs. Implementation (i), on the other hand, offers no line of expla-
nation, since regular intensional arguments, CQs and SSs all receive the same struc-
tural analysis.
In sum, matching effects in Catalan and Spanish free relatives argue for a uni-
fied analysis of CQs and SSs within implementation (ii).
4. Conclusions
A unified intensional analysis of concealed question NPs with know and specifi-
cational subject NPs with be has been proposed in which the NP combines with
an ANS(wer) operator to construct the intensional argument of the verb. First, fol-
lowing and developing Romero (2003), we noted that CQs with know and SSs with
be display certain ambiguity absent in extensional contexts. Then, these two con-
structions are given an intensional analysis with two possible implementations. In
implementation (i), the semantic contribution of the NP –of type <s,e> or <s,<s,e>>–
directly combines with the verb. In implementation (ii), the operator ANS inter-
venes between the verb and the NP, and the complex ANS(NP) –of type <s,<s,t>>–
provides the argument of the verb. Three sets of data are then introduced in sup-
port of the unified analysis under implementation (ii). The first set of data, on gen-
der in pronominalization, suggests that the argument of know and be, unlike that
of regular intensional verbs like look for, is propositional in nature, thus support-
ing implementation (ii). Coordination examples constitute the second set of data,
arguing that the argument of know/be is ontologically different from that of regu-
lar intensional verbs, as predicted under implementation (ii). Third and finally,
matching effects in Catalan and Spanish free relatives suggest that an extra syn-
tactic layer intervenes between know/be and their argument NP, as proposed in
implementation (ii).
In the bigger picture, the choice between implementation (i) and implementa-
tion (ii) has important repercussions for the explanation of connectivity effects in
specificational sentences. Recall from section 2.3 that implementations (i) and (ii)
differ not only in the shape and type of the pre-copular constituent, but also in the
syntactic structure the post-copular phrase. Whereas implementation (i) analyzes sen-
tence (104) as having a post-copular NP, as in (105), implementation (ii) attribut-
es to it a post-copular partially elided clause, as in (106).
(104) What he ate was potatoes.
(105) Implementation (i):
[NP<s,e> What he ate] was [NPe potatoes]
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[XP<s,<s,t>> ANS what he ate]    was    [IP<s,t> he ate potatoes]
In fact, the syntactic representations in implementations (i) and (ii) correspond
to those of two important theories in the analysis of connectivity: the ‘as is’ account
(Jacobson (1994), Sharvit (1999), Cecchetto (2000), Heller (2002)) and the ques-
tion plus deletion account (Ross (1972), den Dikken et al. (2000), Ross (2000) and
Schlenker (2003)), respectively. In the ‘as is’ account, the sentences (107) and (108)
have the syntactic representations in (109), and connectivity effects arise through
purely semantic –not syntactic– mechanisms. For example, variable binding con-
nectivity in (108) –i.e., the semantic effect of understanding his as co-valued with
the variable introduced by no boy– is not derived through LF c-command of no
boy over his, but it is derived from analyzing the pre- and post-copular constituents
as denoting functions of type <e,e>, as spelled out in (110).
(107) The person he1 likes the most is himself1.
(108) The woman no boy1 saw was his1 mother.
(109) ‘As is’ account:
a. [NP The person he1 likes the most]   is   [NP himself1]
b. [NP The woman no boy1 saw ]   was   [NP his1 mother]
(110) íg<e,e> [Natural(g) ∧ ¬∃xe [boy(x) ∧ see(x,g(x))] ] = λye.íze[mother(z,y)]
In the question plus deletion account, instead, connectivity effects are syntac-
tically derived. They arise from the syntactic representation of the post-copular
constituent, which is a partially elided clause, as illustrated in (111). In this respect,
the relation between the pre-copular and the post-copular constituents is parallel
to that between questions and partially elided answers, as in (112).
(111) Question plus deletion account:
a. [NP The person he1 likes the most]   is   [IP he1 likes himself1 the most]
b. [NP The woman no boy1 saw ]   was   [IP no boy1 saw his1 mother]
(112) a. A: Which person does he1 like the most?
B: He1 likes himself1 the most.
b. A: Which woman did no boy1 see?
B: No boy1 saw his1 mother.
In summary, the arguments presented in this paper in support of the semantic
implementation (ii) also argue for the syntactic representation provided in the ques-
tion plus deletion account and against the syntactic representation in the ‘as is’
account. As these two accounts give a different analysis of connectivity, the argu-
ments in this paper indirectly yield support for the syntactic derivation of connec-
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connectivity in the ‘as is’ account.
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